Повежите се са нама

Кина

Кинеска дипломатија дугова - сада прети Европи?

ОБЈАВИ:

објављен

on

Користимо вашу регистрацију за пружање садржаја на начин на који сте пристали и за боље разумевање вас. Можете се одјавити у било ком тренутку.

China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (the so-called 16+1 Group) are Састанак in Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, to discuss avenues for further cooperation. Depending on what is agreed at the summit, the meeting could have profound implications for the European Union as a whole. 11 of the 16 CEE nations are EU member states, while the other five are Western Balkan nations hoping to eventually join the bloc.

 

The 16+1 forum has been used in the past to promote Chinese interests inside the European institutions, such as watering down a 2016 EU изјава on China’s creeping militarization of the South China Sea. At a time when the EU’s поделе over issues such as migration are already on full display, the Sofia conference may sow further discord.

 

China has already sunk some serious cash into the 16+1 countries, particularly in the Balkan region, where public finances remain shaky. Beijing has won over the public with инвестиције such as the purchase of Serbia’s only steel plant, which helped save jobs in a struggling industry. Despite a сонда by the European Commission, China still plans to build a high-speed railway linking the Serbian capital, Belgrade, to the Hungarian capital, Budapest. As the Balkans’ EU accession talks drag on, Beijing’s financing may prove particularly attractive.

 

реклама

The summit will also likely feature the announcement of some new grandiose plans for Chinese investment into CEE countries, fitting neatly into the disconcerting pattern which has been dubbed “debt trap diplomacy”: China offers cheap, easy-to-obtain loans to fund infrastructure projects around the world, sometimes for projects that have been rejected by other international lenders. Many countries desperately need the funding—but the problem comes when, by taking on staggering amounts of Chinese debt, governments jeopardise vital resources and their economic sovereignty. The agreements often require borrowers to contract with Chinese-run firms, and the resulting infrastructure projects tend to overshoot deadlines and budgets.

 

So then why are European nations courting Beijing? As it turns out, Chinese infrastructure investment is still seen as a rather exotic source of capital in certain quarters. Not only is capital more easily available in Europe than in developing countries China is usually active in, but European sources of capital offer very competitive terms. What this means is that EU member states only have limited experience working with Beijing and are unaware of the risks that could come from the Middle Kingdom’s “debt trap diplomacy”

With the CEE countries trying hard to curry favour with Xi Jinping, perhaps it’s worth remembering that Chinese investment earns a bad rap over the long term in most countries where Beijing is allowed to develop strategic projects.

 

Just look to Sri Lanka: when the country said it was unable to repay its debt for a port project, China затражио control of the infrastructure it financed. In some extreme situations, the Chinese debt collectors ask for more than just infrastructure: in 2011, Tajikistan actually предао part of its territory to China in exchange for having some of its debt forgiven.

 

More and more countries could be left in hock to China as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s sweeping plan to finance a network of railways, shipping lanes and energy pipelines across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

 

A недавни извештај by the Center for Global Development, a US think tank, found Djibouti, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia and Montenegro were “at particular risk of debt distress” as a result of BRI deals. The temptation to accept “easy cash” from China puts these countries in danger of assuming unbearable financial burdens, and ultimately of handing economic and political influence over to China.

 

Among the eight countries the report singled out, Djibouti has become particularly dependent on Chinese investment. Djibouti has been ruled since 1999 by autocratic strongman Ismail Omar Guelleh, who is not beholden to democratic checks and balances and was therefore free to pile up $ КСНУМКС милијарди of debt to Beijing, nearly equivalent to the country’s entire annual economic output. China has “надарен” Djibouti with new shopping malls, airports, an electric train to Ethiopia, and налази се its only overseas military base, a hulking fortress capable of hosting up to 10,000 soldiers, there. Earlier this year Djibouti sparked a legal row with the UAE by forcibly nationalising the Doraleh Container Terminal from Dubai-based owners DP World, and there is нагађања that the key port will be handed over to China.

 

Developing nations like Djibouti have easily fallen into this debt trap because of how badly they need the infrastructure improvements that Chinese cash can provide, but the risk is clearly not limited to emerging economies. As a result, apprehension about China’s risky chequebook diplomacy now extends to Brussels, where leaders are debating whether the European Union can reap the economic benefits of Chinese investment without leaving Europe’s natural and strategic assets exposed.

 

Indeed, it is China’s investment in sensitive fields like energy, transport, telecoms and high-tech manufacturing—areas where serious security issues could arise should debts turn sour—which worries EU leaders the most. State-backed Chinese entities are helping fund the Hinkley Point nuclear plant development in the UK, and have made big moves in Portugal, buying up stakes in the energy company EDP and the power grid operator REN.

 

Europe is slowly waking up to the need to curtail—or at least regulate—this influx of Chinese funds. Last year, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker unveiled plans to create a new screening framework to scrutinise foreign investment deals. It is Europe’s responsibility, Juncker said, to make sure that such deals are transparent and subject to careful review and debate. Juncker’s vetting proposal, backed strongly by France, Italy and Germany, would allow member states to raise security concerns about high-profile foreign investments, though it’s unclear whether it would be strong enough to prevent China from gaining a dangerous foothold in Europe.

 

While Europe has long valued the free movement of capital and many member states will be reluctant to restrict the jobs and growth which Chinese investment promises, one thing is clear—Europe needs to act to prevent its sovereignty being eroded by a mountain of Chinese debt.

 

 

 

Поделите овај чланак:

ЕУ Репортер објављује чланке из разних спољних извора који изражавају широк спектар гледишта. Ставови заузети у овим чланцима нису нужно ставови ЕУ Репортера.

Трендови